Remarks at New England Circle

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Thank you very much, Bill.* I'm delighted to be here, and you have provided me with a number of special treats, not the least of which was to meet the other Bill Webster.** I have to confess that when I came to Amherst we went through immediate rushing and I joined a fraternity. The fraternity members were in great glee because they thought they had captured a legacy from the house next door. Tonight I met the Bill Webster they thought they had captured.

At the President's briefing yesterday morning, I mentioned to John Sununu that I was coming here tonight and he left me feeling that I was going to have a great time. He said he has appeared here and enjoyed himself, and that I would enjoy myself. Thank you for inviting me.

I don't want to make a speech, but I'd like to talk for a few minutes about intelligence and the role of the CIA. I want to be sure that I at least introduce you to some of the things we are doing and some of the challenges that the President faces. And I won't try to supply all of the answers. In fact, I usually carry a little button around that says "My job is so secret that even I don't know what I'm doing." But I would like to at least discuss a few issues that might provoke some questions if you hadn't already intended to ask them.

Intelligence is gathering information that will be useful to policymakers in making wise decisions. That's the way I see it and that's the way the Agency sees it. And it is important for you to understand that we do not make foreign policy. We do not even participate in making foreign policy. We participate in supplying what I think George Bush has referred to as the factual foundation upon which to predicate good foreign policy.

In order for intelligence to be useful, it must be timely. Equally important, it has to be objective. And that is where we get away from, and I've tried to draw myself away from, the foreign policy process. We can't be so far apart that we are out gathering information on something that's not useful or helpful to policymakers. But we must make sure that the entire Intelligence Community is heard—NSA, DIA, the military, and so on—especially in preparing national estimates. We must do our jobs in such a way that no one can accuse us of "cooking the books." And I have not heard that kind of allegation since I've been on board, because we have done a number of things to make certain that the policymakers understand we are

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giving them our best shot of what the facts are. We do not try to force the facts to come out with a CIA foreign policy.

We are facing a number of major intelligence needs for the new Administration, most of which center around the Soviet Union. And it is a very exciting time because in the last year there have been a number of openings—I think it's too much to say that peace is breaking out all over the world—but a number of developments that suggest some form of solution seems to be possible. I think the Persian Gulf is a good example. There is potential for peace in Angola and Cambodia, and there is hope in a wide range of areas that have occupied many of our resources and commanded a good deal of our attention.

We're trying to keep abreast of what is actually happening—trying to understand what is real and what is intended for our consumption but does not represent any diminution of the threat to our national security.

The exchanges between President Reagan and Gorbachev are most interesting and in some senses most promising. We have even started collecting stories on each other. Now you know we can read their newspapers, and their papers are more open and there is a lot more being said. One of the great challenges, of course, now in this age of glasnost is to sift through this enormous amount of material that was not previously available to collectors and analysts of intelligence on the Soviets and understand what is true. But we are getting a lot of perestroika stories and one of them we delivered to President Reagan.

This story involved Gorbachev's effort to take a sounding in the Urals on the progress of perestroika. He sent an emissary out to the small villages, and the emissary went to see the mayors. He was in one village and he asked the usual preliminary questions and then said, "Do you know about perestroika?"

"Of course we know about perestroika; we are very much involved in perestroika."

"And how is it working for you?"

"It's working wonderfully."

"How are things in the village?"

"The village is fine."

"Do you have any television sets in the village?"

And the answer was, "We have a television set in every hut in this hamlet, and in some huts we have several television sets."

"What about refrigerators?"

"Every hut has a refrigerator."

And finally the emissary said, "Do you know who I am?"

And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA agent would come into a town with no electricity and ask questions like that?"

There is a lot of superficial civility going on these days. Somebody tonight, I think it was Professor Daniloff, reminded me that Chebrikov, the former KGB director, quoted an interview I gave to *The Los Angeles Times* a year or so ago discussing our ability to collect information after the penetration of the Moscow Embassy—electronic penetration of the embassy. Chebrikov used me as an example, and he said that nothing could be plainer—the Soviets need more money for counterintelligence to protect themselves from the Americans. There's a lot of talk of that kind going on and even some suggestion that maybe—since there have been bilateral exchanges with the army and meetings between Shultz and Shevardnadze—perhaps we ought to have an exchange with the KGB. Just a month ago, Jack Matlock, our Ambassador, actually did meet with Kryuchkov, the new director of the KGB, for about three hours. I mention that to say that those are things that change the ambience but do not necessarily change certain fundamental facts of what is going on in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's activities are extraordinary. He is an extraordinary person, and he has "stirred the stew" enormously—both in terms of glasnost and perestroika. He has done this in economic terms and he has done it in political terms. He's done it even in foreign affairs with all of these initiatives—initiatives to which we are still reacting. We are often as concerned with what he is going to do next as with what we should be doing around the world to better deal with the prospects for security and peace. And all of this is going to require and is requiring constant attention on our part. We have many intelligence analysts dedicated to this. There are a lot of them—I can't give you the number but I can tell you that they are very good. They are trying to bring together this information in a meaningful way and present it to our policymakers to help them decide which ways to go on foreign policy, on military affairs, and especially on arms control. We are trying to measure current Soviet spending on the military and their plans for the future. We measure this against all the things that Gorbachev says he's going to do about pulling troops back from the Bloc countries away from Western Europe; making actual defense cuts, which is unprecedented; and the discussions about giving up bases, such as the Soviets giving up Cam Ranh and the U.S. giving up Subic. Or discussions like pulling our airplanes out of Italy if the Soviets move troops back from Hungary. It's a constant cacophony of new ideas and initiatives, and we must do our job in analyzing and assessing costs, benefits, and reality to help the policymakers decide whether to take Gorbachev up on these proposals.

The whole arms control effort is going to be a big strain for us. We got through the INF treaty pretty well. Under that treaty, we have to monitor activities at 120 Soviet locations. Of course, the Soviets are over here doing their inspections as well. If the START treaty becomes effective, we are looking at monitoring not 120 but 2,500 locations in the Soviet Union—a very big job—one that is going to require human intelligence, signals intelligence, our satellites in space, a whole range of our resources. For that reason I think the Soviets will continue to be our major interest.

We have dropped from about 85 percent to maybe 40 percent of our time concentrating on the Soviet Union as regional conflicts developed around the world, conflicts such as those in Central American countries—El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, you name it. We also focus on conflicts in other regions where the situation was once not so optimistic—Cambodia, Angola, and the Gulf. But now with Gorbachev's initiatives, we are spending more and more of our resources on the Soviet Union.

But there are three or four other issues I want to mention briefly that I think are global in nature and will continue to require our resources and our best efforts. One of these is the proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially in Third World countries. With ballistic missiles, there is an increase both in damage potential and in range. Smaller countries close to each other are in a position to create a lot more trouble than they ever were in the past. We've calculated that by the year 2000 there will be as many as 15 countries that have their own ballistic missile capability. That does not mean that they can buy missiles from the Chinese or from one of the other missile makers, but that they can produce them themselves—which adds to the national security issue. If you couple that with the emergence of significant chemical warfare capabilities and biological warfare capabilities, you see a real problem. There are about 20 countries that are now capable of producing chemical warfare weapons on their own, and there are at least 10 countries that are working to produce biological weapons.

The conference on chemical weapons in Paris a couple of weeks ago contributed a great deal toward galvanizing national and international concern about coming to grips with the problem. Identification of the Libyan plant in Rabta, southwest of Tripoli, focused on specifics so that the world could see the kind of activity that was taking place in that country. And I think that we will be trying to watch and understand the activities in other Third World countries. This is quite difficult because these chemicals are the same chemicals used in fertilizer and pharmaceutical plants, and so the plants are much tougher to identify. But the problem has been laid out for the world to see, and the policymakers, we trust, will come to grips with some of the solutions.

I think of the visit I had with King Hussein a year and a half ago, and I think about the problems in the Middle East. You go to the Golan Heights and you look and see the proximity to Syria and Jordan. King Hussein and I were talking about this, and he asked, "Why did God put all the prophets in one place?" It was a rather profound question because with the emergence of fundamentalism, and not just Islamic fundamentalism, we have the potential for people to take the kind of weapons I've been talking about and use them in a very destructive way, and reach cities that could not be reached before. And this is altering a great many strategic concepts on how you keep peace. Now you have a poor man's counterpart for nuclear weapons, so we're going to have a big problem to deal with in that area.

Another issue we are addressing is the worldwide problem of terrorism. We had 850 terrorist incidents last year that took place in 70 countries. Some 620 people were killed, and 1,000 people were wounded. At least 25 percent of all terrorist incidents around the world are aimed at U.S. persons, U.S. institutions, or U.S. properties.

Narcotics is a national security issue given what it is doing to our country, given what it is doing in terms of destabilizing many of the democratic countries for which we had great hopes a few years ago. Both political parties in our country committed themselves to do something about the narcotics problem. It is clear that both the President and the Congress are going to be making major efforts to come to grips with the problem that has gone unsolved despite enormous amounts of money committed to it, major efforts by the Reagan Administration, major arrests, and major convictions. I think there are at least 30 percent more people in prison today than there were 10 years ago, mainly because of drugs. You have Washington, D.C. as the murder capital of the world, and it's no longer because of crimes of passion—it's because of drugs.

There's going to be a major effort to deal with drugs worldwide. The Intelligence Community has lagged behind in providing a concerted contribution to counternarcotics. It has never really thought of narcotics as a Community-wide intelligence issue. Over the years we've picked up responsibility; we do important global intelligence collection. Our satellites in space take pictures of crop growth, we do estimates on volume, and we advise other countries of what's happening in their own countries. We provide training and support counternarcotics activities in other countries, and we provide strategic and tactical intelligence. But it hasn't been pulled together in the way that I want it to be pulled together, and we're in the process of reorganizing our counternarcotics capability to meet the demands of the new Administration. Bill Bennett, the new drug czar, has a strong voice and a bully pulpit, and we're going to be hearing from him. I want to make sure that the Intelligence Community does its part.

In addition to terrorism and narcotics, we also have the growing problem of counterintelligence. I'll just simply say that all the good things that have happened concerning openness in the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries have not altered for one minute or one beat of time the efforts of the Soviets to acquire, through theft, the secrets of the United States—particularly military secrets and high technology. If anything, the Soviets have increased their intelligence gathering efforts, and we correspondingly have to increase our ability to protect our secrets—not only in the United States, but all around the world.

I'll finish my preliminary remarks by saying that we have a lot to do, and we are careful in the way that we do it. We don't have a CIA foreign policy, we are very much accountable, and we devise our programs to be sure that we are in compliance with the laws of this country. It would be foolish for me to contend that we are in compliance with the laws of all the countries wherever we have a mission to collect, because we could not be and discharge our mission. But we are within U.S. laws and subject to all the controls Congress and the Administration place on us. We support oversight and work with the oversight committees. We may have problems from time to time, but we do work within that process, trying in our relationship with the Congress to build rather than erode trust and confidence. I hope this has been brief, but not too brief, to stimulate some thought.